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Stress clearly influences decision making, but the effects are complex. This review
focuses on the potential for stress to promote prosocial decisions, serving others at a
temporary cost to the self. Recent work has shown altruistic responses under stress,
particularly when the target’s need is salient. We discuss potential mechanisms for
these effects, including emotional contagion and offspring care mechanisms. These
neurobiological mechanisms may promote prosocial—even heroic—action, particularly
when an observer knows the appropriate response and can respond to a target in need.
The effects of stress on behavior are not only negative, they can be adaptive and altruistic
under conditions that promote survival and well-being at the individual and group level.
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INTRODUCTION
When most people say that they are “stressed”, they are referring
to a negative, subjective feeling of being overwhelmed by the
amount of work or responsibilities facing them—an amount
that may be too much to handle. In contrast, the biological
term “stress” refers to an evolved, metabolic, neurohormonal
response to unpredictability and uncontrollability, which pre-
pares the organism for acute threat, centering around the coordi-
nated action of the sympathetic nervous system and hypothalamic
pituitary adrenocortical (HPA) axis (Mason, 1968a,b; Koolhaas
et al., 2011). This stress response promotes adaptive action to
real challenge and is not necessarily damaging unless chronic.
Using this biological framework for understanding stress, we
review recent and accumulating evidence that stress can actually
promote prosocial behavior. Here, we define prosocial behavior as
occurring whenever someone voluntarily and intentionally serves
another at a temporary cost to the self (Eisenberg and Miller,
1987). While there are myriad effects of stress on behavior, we
only briefly discuss those before focusing on the role of stress
in prosocial behavior per se, which is not often appreciated and
can be best understood through this functional, neurobiological
approach.
STRESS AND DECISION MAKING
The physiological stress response evolved as an adaptive way to
motivate behavior and release metabolic energy in situations of
acute need (see Johnson et al., 1992; Sapolsky et al., 2000). For
example, when an organism detects the presence of a predator, a
stress response may be activated that temporarily delays longer-
term processes like wound healing and digestion in order to
marshal an active response like fighting or running away. Such
stress-induced responses are not always aggressive, however, as
heroic rescues provide dramatic examples of prosocial responses
to stress and challenge.
The adaptive stress response includes both metabolic and
behavioral changes (Pfaff, 2005). Stress-induced changes in
behavior and metabolism often work together toward the same
goal. For example, stress-induced vasopressin enhances thirst
behavior while increasing water retention via the kidneys (Vander
et al., 1998). Similarly, epinephrine release enhances attentional
processes and accelerates the heart, both of which promote
responsiveness in times of need (Mason, 1968b). While stress
enhances the processing of needed resources like metabolic
energy, it does so by temporarily reducing longer-term func-
tions that are not immediately necessary, like digestion, growth,
and immune function (see Johnson et al., 1992). This shift in
metabolic and behavioral processing from building for the future,
to focusing on the present emergency is adaptive for current sur-
vival but unsustainable in the long term. While most researchers
emphasize the role of this shift towards immediacy for promoting
aggressive or fearful behaviors, it may play a similar role in
prosocial acts, particularly during emergencies, when people must
act quickly to assist endangered others.
Much of the research examining the influence of stress on
decision making in humans has focused on risk taking at the
individual level, such as examining how someone’s stress may
affect their decisions to risk money under changing probabilities
of winning or losing. The consensus from this work is that stress
does indeed affect decision making, but in a complex manner that
is dependent upon the timing and type of decision as well as the
age and gender of the decision maker (for reviews see Mather
and Lighthall, 2012; Starcke and Brand, 2012). As an illustrative
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example of this complexity, in our own study examining the
effects of stress on gambling, females made more advantageous
choices after stress while males made more disadvantageous
choices (Preston et al., 2007b). In another study, stressed partic-
ipants performed more advantageously in a Game of Dice task
when they were tested soon after the stressor, when the adrenergic
system was most activated, but were less advantageous later when
glucocorticoid levels were at their peak (Pabst et al., 2013).
Because results in this domain sometimes report more
advantageous decisions under stress and other times report more
disadvantageous decisions, it is too soon to make sweeping gen-
eralizations about the effects of stress on decision making. But
generally, studies that examine stress effects on learning and
memory find an increased reliance on automatic over controlled
cognitive processes during stress (Schwabe et al., 2012). For
example, stressed rodents and humans increasingly rely upon
habitual behaviors, rather than more flexible cognitive strategies
in a learning task (Schwabe et al., 2008; Schwabe and Wolf,
2009). Similarly in human decision making, stressed humans
make quick, heuristic judgments rather than more contemplative
ones (i.e., relying on System 1 over System 2, cf., Kahneman, 2011;
see review in Starcke and Brand, 2012). Such habitual responses
do not map neatly onto risk aversion or risk seeking (or advan-
tageous vs. disadvantageous decisions), as one can habitually or
intuitively make a conservative choice—such as sticking with a
low-payoff, low-risk investment—or a very risky one—such as
choosing to snatch a child from the path of an oncoming car.
Across cases, however, stress appears to adaptively shift the focus
of the individual on the immediate issue so that they can respond
quickly while discounting longer-term problems that may be
irrelevant at present, similar to the effects of stress on metabolic
function.
There is also a considerable body of work demonstrating
the effects of the social environment on decision making across
species, particularly with regard to decisions in the context of
scarcity (for review see van den Bos et al., 2013). While group
living provides fitness benefits to both the individual, her relatives,
and the group as a whole (Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 2007),
group life also utilizes more resources than independent living
and adds significant social stress from trying to balance needs
across group members. Interactions with conspecifics are among
the most unpredictable and uncontrollable situations that an
organism can encounter (for review see Buchanan et al., 2009)—
characteristics that are central to the initiation of a physiological
stress response (Mason, 1968a,b; Koolhaas et al., 2011). For exam-
ple, disputes over shared resources can lead to potentially lethal
aggression against rivals (Potegal and Knutson, 1994; Anderson
and Bushman, 2002; Miczek et al., 2007). However, just as the
effects of stress on decision making in general do not only predict
simple, unidirectional outcomes, stress in a social group context
can also foster affiliative responses, depending on what is more
adaptive for the individual in context. For example, studies of
crowding in nonhuman primates found that, contrary to the
assumption that crowding unilaterally produces violence and
aggression, monkeys and apes actually increase affiliative gestures
and grooming when crowded to compensate for the challenges of
reduced space (de Waal et al., 2000).
STRESS CAN HAVE PROSOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
A growing body of research describes situations where stress
actually promotes prosocial behaviors like empathy and altruism
(Taylor et al., 2000; de Waal and Suchak, 2010). Here we review
some of key findings and discuss potential mechanisms to provide
a counterpoint to the prevailing view of stress as only promoting
aggressive or negative effects on health, brain function, and deci-
sion making (Shirtcliff et al., 2009).
Males often exhibit a “fight-or-flight” response to stress, but
females across many species may be better characterized by
a more prosocial “tend and befriend” response (Taylor et al.,
2000; Preston, 2013). Tending, meaning caring for offspring,
and befriending, meaning connecting with conspecifics, protects
an organism’s offspring and may help social groups collaborate
under stressful conditions (Taylor et al., 2000). Several recent
studies have supported the concept that stress can lead to proso-
cial behavior, even in males (Takahashi et al., 2007; von Dawans
et al., 2012; Vinkers et al., 2013). In one study, healthy young
men were exposed to a stressful task (the Trier Social Stress Test)
or a nonstressful comparison task, followed by measures of pro-
social and anti-social behavior. The stress condition increased
subsequent trust, trustworthiness, and sharing, without changing
punishment or non-social risk taking (von Dawans et al., 2012),
undermining the assumption that stressed men would revert to
anti-social “fight-or-flight” responses and supporting the possi-
bility of prosocial effects. In another study, people were more
prosocial when they decided more quickly (Rand et al., 2012),
indicating that even a shift towards more automatic responses—as
occur under stress—can produce prosocial outcomes. In another
study, Vinkers et al. (2013) showed greater altruistic punishment
in the Ultimatum Game when participants were tested imme-
diately after a stressor (rather than 90 min after stress onset),
demonstrating a greater tendency to punish non-cooperators in
the early phase of the stress response. Stress induced by the
Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) did not lead to increased selfish
responses in a moral decision making task in young healthy men
and women, but those individuals who showed a greater stress-
induced cortisol response made more selfish decisions (Starcke
et al., 2011). By contrast, participants who reported greater
positive affect in response to the TSST made more altruistic
decisions. These results demonstrate how individual differences
in physiological and psychological responses to stress may push
decision making from self-less to selfish. Individuals who find a
stressor to be more of a challenge (and report more positive affect,
Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) may respond to another in need in a
more prosocial manner. This is in contrast to individuals who find
a stressor to be a threat (and produce more of a cortisol response).
These individuals may respond to others in a more selfish manner.
POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR STRESS-INDUCED
ALTRUISTIC AID
Preston et al. (2007a,b) have extended the known neural mech-
anisms required for caring for and retrieving helpless offspring
in rats, mice, and monkeys to the context of human aid (Brown
et al., 2012; Preston, 2013). The neural circuits supporting off-
spring care and retrieval largely overlap with those generally
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associated with motivational decision and reward processes in
the mammalian mesolimbocortical system, including the amyg-
dala, orbitofrontal cortex, nucleus accumbens, and downstream
motor regions as well as neurohormones like dopamine, oxy-
tocin, and the hormones of pregnancy and parturition (see also
Preston and de Waal, 2011). These circuits act in concert to shift
responses to vulnerable neonates from avoidance to approach as
a result of the birth process or passive habituation (for virgin
females and even for males), with a critical role for the medial
preoptic area of the hypothalamus in retrieval per se (Lonstein
and Morrell, 2007; Numan, 2011). Thus, these systems promote
action towards one’s own offspring, but can also promote active
retrieval and protection of unrelated, distressed offspring, even in
nonparents.
By extending this neural system for offspring care to human
altruism—helping unrelated individuals at a current cost to
the self—one can perhaps understand seemingly reckless acts
of heroic human altruism under stressful conditions, as when
people rush into burning buildings, icy waters, or onto subway
tracks to save complete strangers. These emergency situations,
and many less dramatic or potentially lethal cases, inherently
involve a high level of stress in the target in need as well as
surrounding observers. Despite this stress—and perhaps even
because of it (we would argue)—people do sometimes make an
immediate and risky decision to help. Of course, people also often
respond selfishly or apathetically to those in need in these stressful
situations, as shown in bystander apathy research (Darley and
Latane, 1968; Latane and Darley, 1969). But theory and research
suggest that these dichotomous responses can be mapped on to
the avoidance vs. approach systems of rodent offspring care in
a way that predicts that humans will avoid helping when they
are fearful and/or lack the necessary response but will “rush in”
when they feel confident and know what to do (see Preston, 2013
for details). Thus, some of the most compelling human examples
of altruism—heroic ones where someone risks their very life to
save a complete stranger—can take place in the context of acute
stress and are enacted for the benefit of another, even unrelated
individual.
This offspring care framework for understanding altruism
does not assume that stress evolved to either promote or prevent
prosocial responding per se. Rather, the assumption (outlined in
Preston and de Waal, 2011; Preston, 2013) is that the nervous sys-
tem of altricial mammals evolved to attend to and respond to cues
of offspring distress or vulnerability, at a benefit to inclusive fit-
ness (cf., Hamilton, 1964). In addition, the stress response evolved
independently but in tandem to secure metabolic resources for
any immediate threat or need, at a benefit to one’s direct fitness.
Once in place, these systems became motivationally independent
of their origin and thus could be activated in group contexts under
highly similar conditions to offspring care, even for unrelated or
adult targets or abstract situations of need. It is assumed that even
costly giving to strangers is adaptive or at least not selected against
because the inherent approach-avoidance mechanism protects
against responding when it endangers the giver or when the
target does not have a real need. Moreover altruism promotes
cooperation in group life and those highly dangerous acts of help
are rare enough to limit the effects on reproductive success and
also entail some benefits of their own to the giver (i.e., the rewards
of heroism).
PERCEPTION-ACTION PROCESSES SUGGEST AFFECTIVE CONTAGION
Perception-action models of emotion (Preston and De Waal,
2002; Gallese et al., 2004; Singer and Lamm, 2009) suggest that
the mere attended perception of another’s affective state spon-
taneously activates part of the observer’s own neural represen-
tations for feeling that state (see Preston and Hofelich, 2012
for a detailed explanation). This shared representational space
is thought to be a byproduct of the way the nervous system
evolved to process others’ actions and states, by making efficient
use of representations that were already encoded and produced
sensible action even when activated by others’ states. In salient
cases, activating shared representations for emotions like distress
produces visible or subjectively-felt contagion, as we have all
experienced during a particularly dramatic movie when we feel
a great loss when someone close to the lead character dies or
when we wince in pain when he is injured. However, even when
these phenomena are not subjectively experienced, at least part
of the observer’s representations for feeling the observer’s state
are assumed to be activated by our attended perception of him.
This neural-level shared activation allows observers to cognitively
understand how the other feels, which permits labeling their
emotion and selecting the appropriate response (see also Preston
and Stansfield, 2008; Buchanan et al., 2010; Hofelich and Preston,
2011). Thus, just as observing another person swinging a hammer
activates part of your motor system that you use when swinging
a hammer (Grafton et al., 1996), observing someone in pain
(Singer et al., 2004) or imagining someone who is angry or
afraid (Preston et al., 2007a) will activate common neural patterns
developed through your personal past experiences with pain,
anger, or fear.
If neural systems are generally designed in this perception-
action manner, then it follows that observing another under stress
could also activate observers’ own representations for experienc-
ing stress, with consequent downstream hormonal changes in
more salient cases. However, the case is less straightforward for
stress as for pain or emotions like anger or fear. Biological stress is
by definition an internal state, with unclear overt cues or behav-
iors that can be directly witnessed. Moreover, stressed participants
themselves do not always know when they are stressed, as people
often report that they were “distressed” or “scared” without
producing a correlated, pronounced salivary cortisol response
(Buchanan et al., 1999; Hellhammer and Schubert, 2012). How-
ever, if we can demonstrate that stress is contagious between
individuals, then this could provide a proximate mechanism for
promoting aid in contagiously stressed observers.
THE EMPATHIC TRIER SOCIAL STRESS TEST (eTSST)
Beyond physical emergencies, we often observe stress in others.
What happens to us during these encounters is as varied as our
numbers, but a few predictions can be made from the existing
literature, suggesting that observers can contagiously catch the
stress of targets, which can in turn promote prosocial aid (at
least when there is a clear effective action that the observer can
enact).
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In our research we first wanted to confirm that physiological
stress could resonate between humans (Buchanan et al., 2012). We
used the gold standard of laboratory stress in humans: the Trier
Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993; Dickerson and
Kemeny, 2004). In the typical TSST, physiological measures such
as salivary alpha amylase (sAA; an index of autonomic function)
and cortisol are collected from the person who undergoes the
public speaking and mental arithmetic tasks before observing
experimenters. In our “empathic TSST” (or eTSST), we collected
sAA and cortisol from the observing experimenters (hereafter
“observers”) as well as the stressed speakers. To assess the role of
trait empathy in this physiological stress resonance, observers also
completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983).
The observers did indeed produce resonant cortisol reactivity
in response to viewing stressed speakers, responses that were
proportional to that of their paired speakers and not influenced
by gender (e.g., male observers did not secrete more cortisol
in response to female compared to male speakers). Further,
observers’ trait empathy (assessed with the IRI) was positively
correlated with their cortisol and sAA responses to viewing the
stressed speaker.
The resonant cortisol response that we measured is impor-
tantly not just a shared form of arousal, as the cortisol response
is not elicited by simple arousal (Lundberg and Frankenhaeuser,
1980; Lovallo et al., 1985), but requires combined feelings of
uncontrollability and social evaluation (Dickerson and Kemeny,
2004; Koolhaas et al., 2011). The behavioral “stress” signals
from the speakers that were detected by observers to produce
the resonating stress response are topics for future research.
The Perception Action Model of empathy (Preston and De
Waal, 2002) predicts that observers centrally process a variety
of multimodal cues (e.g., speech pitch, frequency, and con-
tent, facial expressions, posture) as a dynamic pattern that
naturally activates neural patterns of activity in the observers,
including their personal representations of stress from per-
sonal past experience. More empathic observers may show
more physiological resonance with a speaker because they
attend more closely to the speaker’s behavior across channels
(Hofelich and Preston, 2011). Our current and future research
examines the speaker cues associated with resonating stress
in observers and any other observer characteristics that may
contribute.
Future research should address whether this contagious or
empathic stress response in observers of stress will also predispose
observers to help. The offspring care model of altruism (Preston,
2013) predicts that observers who become contagiously activated
by the immediate plight of a target should be more likely to help,
just as contagious stress is thought to promote rescue behaviors
in ants (Nowbahari et al., 2009). However, spontaneous prosocial
responses are expected when an immediate response that the
observer can enact is required. It is unclear what the “response”
would be in the TSST, other than maybe offering reassuring
feedback—a possibility that we are currently examining.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A number of factors influence whether a stressed individual will
act in a prosocial, ambivalent, or antisocial manner towards
others. Research and theory suggest that individuals will actually
respond prosocially during stress when the target is vulnera-
ble, distressed, socially bonded or interdependent and when the
observer does not fear for their own safety or security, does
not have conflicting personal goals, and knows what needs to
be done (Preston and De Waal, 2002; Preston, 2013). We have
demonstrated that stress can be contagiously caught from tar-
gets to observers. Moreover, existing empirical data suggests that
stress can promote prosocial behavior in some situations. These
findings support the assumption that the target and their need
must be salient to drive the response as, for example, stressed
participants in modified dictator games donated more when they
had interacted with the target (von Dawans et al., 2012) but
not when it was a charitable organization (reviewed in van den
Bos et al., 2013; Vinkers et al., 2013). Researchers will need
to measure helping behavior as well as stress physiology in a
much wider variety of contexts than simply donating money. The
eTSST provides one avenue for studying this phenomenon in an
ecological situation, but we also need paradigms that include a
real ability for the observer to help the target in the moment
of need—a feature that is not intrinsic to the TSST situation
but is important in the theoretical offspring care framework. In
addition, research in additional species on the extent to which
aid is delivered under conditions of stress is needed—particularly
to determine if only social species that live in extended groups
show this behavior. With additional research, across species and
domains, we can provide a more complete picture of how stress
guides our decisions for good and for ill.
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